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Faculty and Deans

WHITE COLLAR CRIME: A LEGAL OVERVIEW*
Paul Marcus**
I. INTRODUCTION

In recent years, the number of white collar criminal prosecutions 1
has increased greatly in both state and federal jurisdictions. 2 The

• ©Copyright 1983 by Paul Marcus
• • Professor of Law, University of Illinois College of Law
1. These crimes are called "white collar" because they often involve business persons and
are normally non-violent. The category includes offenses such as fraud, bribery, embezzlement
and securities thefts.
2. See Control of Organized Crime in the United States: Hearings on S.30, and related
proposals, Before Subcomm. No.5 of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 91st Cong., 2nd Sess.
27 (1970). As stated in Developments in the Law-Corporate Crime: Regulating Corporate
Behavior Through Criminal Sanctions, 92 HARV. L. REv. 1227, 1229 (1979): "During the last
decade, however, in areas ranging from tax, securities, and antitrust to the newer fields of
environmental control, safety regulation, and the prevention of corrupt practices, the federal
government has come to rely more and more on the deterrent effect of criminal punishment to
shape corporate action.
The costs of white collar crimes are staggering. See, e.g., White Collar Justice, 19 CRIM. L.
REP. (BNA) 3 (April 14, 1976), reprinted in P. MARCUS, THE PROSECUTION AND DEFENSE OF
CRIMINAL CoNSPIRACY CAsEs § 1.04[3], at 1-24 n.27 (1978}:
THE ANNUAL CosT OF SoME WHITE-CoLLAR CRIMES
(Billions of Dollars)
Bankruptcy Fraud
Bribery, Kickbacks, and Payoffs
Computer-Related Crimes
Consumer Fraud, Illegal Competition,
Deceptive Practices (excluding price
fixing)
Consumer victims:
Business victims:
Government revenue loss:
Credit Card and Check Fraud
Credit Card:
Check:
Embezzlement and Pilferage
Embezzlement
(Cash, goods, services)
Pilferage
Insurance Fraud
Insurer victims
Policy holder victims
Receiving Stolen Property
Securities Thefts and Frauds
TOTAL (billions)

$ 0.08
3.00
0.10

21.00

$ 5.5
$ 3.5
$12.0

1.10
$ 0.1
$ 1.0
7.00

$ 3.0
$ 4.0
2.00

$ 1.5
$ 0.5
3.50
4.00
$41.78
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writers participating in this symposium 3 are all outstanding legal
professionals in the criminal justice field who have had considerable
exposure to the problems central to white collar criminal prosecutions.
While they come from very different backgrounds and, in this symposium, focus on very different issues, one common theme runs throughout each of the articles: Effective prosecution of white collar crime
requires rules and techniques that will allow the government to deal
with groups of persons, rather than with individual defendants. James
Holderman, 4 an experienced federal prosecutor and criminal defense
lawyer, analyzes the RICO statute5 to determine whether it transcends traditional notions of substantive criminal responsibility. Dan
Webb 6 and Scott Turow, 7 both of the United States Attorney's Office
in Chicago, evaluate a new tool under RICO that is available to
federalprosecutors in the battle against white collar crime, the forfeiture.8 Professor Kathleen Brickey9 looks to a very different question.
She considers the application of traditional criminal law principles to
the corporate defendant. Finally, the concluding commentators, Professor Nagel and Dean Plager, 10 neatly tie together many of the issues
raised in the articles.

II.

GROUP DANGER

The principal rationale given for rules that establish group criminal
responsibility is that, with more than one actor involved in the crime,
there is a greater chance that the crime and perhaps other crimes will
be completed.U While this reason is given for the crime of solicitation

3. The participants in this symposium appeared in a panel discussion of the Criminal
Justice Section at the annual meeting of the Association of American Law Schools, which was
held in Cincinnati in January of 1983. This writer had the good fortune to moderate that
discussion.
4. Partner in the Chicago firm of Sonnenschein, Carlin, Nath & Rosenthal.
5. Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1976 &
Supp. V 1981).
6. United States Attorney, Northern District of Illinois.
7. Author of the best-selling book, One L, and Assistant United States Attorney for the
Northern District of Illinois.
8. Forfeiture is also available in those states that have their own RICO statutes. See, e.g.,
Cow. REv. STAT. §§ 18-17-101 to -109 (Supp. 1982); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 30-42-1 to -6 (Supp.
1980).
9. Washington University School of Law.
10. Both of the School of Law, Indiana University, Bloomington.
11. Although this is the principal rationale, it is not the only one. Conspiracy, for instance, is
often emphasized as an inchoate crime. See generally Wechsler, Jones & Korn, The Treatment of
Inchoate Crimes in the Model Penal Code of the American Law Institute: Attempt, Solicitation,
and Conspiracy, 61 CoLUM. L. REv. 957 (1961).
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and for principles of accountability, the rationale is stated most often
and most clearly in the conspiracy area:
For two or more to confederate and combine together to commit or
cause to be committed a breach of the criminal laws, is an offense
outweighing, in injury to the public, the mere commission of the contemplated crime. It involves deliberate plotting to subvert the laws,
educating and preparing the conspirators for further and habitual criminal practices. And it is characterized by secrecy, rendering it difficult of
detection, requiring more time for its discovery, and adding to the
importance of punishing it when discovered. 12

The consequences of utilizing the group danger rationale are great.
Defendants can be joined together for trial, 13 each defendant is responsible for crimes committed by co-defendants, 14 and evidence of
one defendant's activities may be admissible to prove the guilt of
another. 15 These consequences are often difficult to criticize when true
group danger is involved. In those situations, the defendants really do
band together and actually are responsible for the actions of one
another. When no imminent group danger exists, however, one
should be reluctant to impose such harsh consequences on individual

12. United States v. Rabinowich, 238 U.S. 78, 88 (1915); sec also Krulewitch v. United
States, 336 U.S. 440, 448-49 (1949) (Justice Jackson's famous concurring opinion: "It is not
intended to question that the basic conspiracy principle has some place in modern criminal law,
because to unite back of a criminal purpose, the strength, opportunities and resources of many is
obviously more dangerous and more difficult to police than the efforts of a long wrongdoer.").
But see Goldstein, Conspiracy to Defraud the United States, 68 YALE L.J. 405, 414 (1959):
Though these assumed dangers from conspiracy have a romantically individualistic
ring, they have never been verified empirically. It is hardly likely that a search for such
verification would end in support of Holdsworth's suggestion that combination alone is
inherently dangerous. This view is immediately refuted by reference to our own society,
which is grounded in organization and agreement .. More likely, empirical investigation
would disclose that that there is as much reason to believe that a large number of
participants will increase the prospect that the plan will be leaked as that it will be kept
secret; or that the persons involved will share their uncertainties and dissuade each
other as that each will stiffen the others' determination. Most probably, however, the
factors ordinarily mentioned as warranting the crime of conspiracy would be found to
add to the danger to be expected from a group in certain situations and not in others;
the goals of the group and the personalities of its members would make any generalization unsafe and hence require some other explanation for treating conspiracy as a
separate crime in all cases.
(emphasis in original).
13. Under FED. R. CmM. P. 8(b), two or more defendants may be joined together for trial "if
they are alleged to have participated in the same act or transaction or in the same series of acts or
transactions constituting an offense or offenses."
14. In the conspiracy area, the major limitation is that the crimes must be reasonably
foreseeable. Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640, 647-48 (1946).
15. The most discussed example of this consequence is the rule that admits statements by coconspirators made in furtherance of the conspiracy. See FED. R. Evm. 801(d)(2)(E).
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defendants. This, no doubt, explains the harsh attacks made on the
"unilateral approach" to conspiracy proposed in the Model Penal
Code. 16 Under this approach, a single defendant may be convicted of
conspiracy even if no other person conspired with her, so long as she
believed that a conspiracy existed. This writer previously has questioned the purpose for such an approach:
The so-called unilateral approach does make some sense. As the supporters say, the unsuccessful conspirator did try to conspire so his state
of mind is clearly a criminal one. True enough, but did he enter into a
conspiracy? After all, the conspiracy charge subjects a defendant to
criminal liability at a stage earlier than any other inchoate offense and
may raise grave procedural problems at the time of trial. And, the
reason for such results is that there is a special, added danger, resulting
from group planning. Yet, in the unilateral situation there is no conspiracy, no added group danger, for the fact remains there was not an
agreement between two persons. The defendant may have wanted to
agree, may have intended to agree, and may have even believed he had
agreed; but there was not agreement, no true planning by two or more
persons, no meeting of the minds between the parties. 17

Mr. Holderman's article levels much the same criticism at the expansive reading given to the federal RICO statute by some courts. As
he cogently points out, these courts have viewed the enterprise elements of RICO as replacing the inadequate wheel and chain rationales of conspiracy law.JB Holderman contends, however, that this is a
mistaken reading of RICO and that courts should maintain traditional
conspiracy precepts in analyzing multi-defendant complicity in the
RICO context. 19 Unless there is in fact an association of persons united
for the same goals, there cannot be the kind of group danger that
conspiracy law and the RICO statute should be used to combat. 20
16. The Illinois Criminal Code is based upon the Model Penal Code. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38,
§ 8-2 (Smith-Hurd 1972) states: "A person commits conspiracy when, with intent that an offense

be committed, he agrees with another to the commission of that offense." The key language is
that the defendant "agrees with another," which sharply contrasts with the usual requirement
that there be a "combination between two or more persons." See IowA CoDE ANN. § 706.1 (West
1979). The problem is raised most often in cases where there are only two "conspirators," and
one is actually feigning agreement. See, e.g., People v. Berkowitz, 50 N.Y. 2d 333, 406 N.E.2d
783,428 N.Y.S.2d 927 (1980); State v. St. Christopher, 305 Minn. 226,232 N.W.2d 798 (1975).
17. P. MARCUS, PROSECUTION AND DEFENSE OF CRIMINAL CONSPIRACY CASES§ 2.04, 2-ll to 212 (Cum. Supp. 1979).
18. Holderman, Reconciling RICO's Conspiracy and 'Group' Enterprise Concepts with
Traditional Conspiracy Doctrine, 52 U. CIN. L. REv. 385 (1983).
19. Id. at 402-03.
20. The RICO statute was enacted "to seek the eradication of organized crime ... by
establishing new penal prohibitions, and by providing enhanced sanctions and new remedies to
deal with the unlawful activities of those engaged in organized crime." Organized Crime
Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, § 1, 84 Stat. 922, 923.
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The courts increasingly are recognizing Mr. Holderman's position.
Few judges expressly call for a broad theory of liability under the
RICO statute. 21 In many cases, of course, a broad reading is not
needed because traditional application of the conspiracy doctrine
would be sufficient to deal with the group danger posed by the
defendants. 22 Courts should follow the guidelines proposed by Mr.
Holderman in the RICO area, as well as under other statutory provisions enacted for dealing with white collar crime. 23 Without such
careful applications, we will be faced with "the due process violation
of associational guilt." 24

III.

NEW REMEDIES

Traditionally, white collar criminals, if convicted, faced the prospect of imprisonment or fine. As Mr. Webb and Mr. Turow note in
their article, 25 however, the RICO statute has designed a new weapon
in the fight against white collar crime. 26 This penalty, just now being

21. At least one court, in fact, has noted to the contrary. See United States v. Bledsoe, 674
F.2d 647, 659 (8th Cir. 1982) ("The Act was not intended to be a catchall reaching all concerted
action of two or more criminals involving two or more of the designated crimes.").
22. See United States v. Errico, 635 F.2d 152, 155-56 (2d Cir. 1980); United States v.
Anderson, 626 F.2d 1358, 1368-69 (8th Cir. 1980).
23. Numerous other recent statutory enactments are designed to deal with organized or
white collar crime. Two of the most famous are the continuing criminal enterprise act, 21
U.S.C. § 848(a) (1976), and 18 U.S.C § 1955 (1976) of the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970.
Section 848(a)(1) provides that "[a]ny person who engages in a continuing criminal enterprise
shall be sentenced to a term of imprisonment which may not be less than 10 years and which may
be up to life imprisonment, to a fine of not more than $100,000, and to a forfeiture prescribed in
paragraph (2) .... " Section 1955 provides:
(a) Whoever conducts, finances, manages, supervises, directs, or owns all or part of an
illegal gambling business shall be fined not more than $20,000 or imprisoned not more
than five years, or both.
(b) As used in this section(1) "illegal gambling business" means a gambling business which(i) is a violation of the law of a State or political subdivision in which it is
conducted;
(ii) involves five or more persons who conduct, finance, manage, supervise,
direct, or own all or part of such business; and
(iii) has been or remains in substantially continuous operation for a period in
excess of thirty days or has a gross revenue of $2,000 in any single day.
24. Holderman, supra note 18, at 390.
25. Webb & Turow, RICO Forfeiture in Practice: A Prosecutorial Perspective, 52 U. CrN.
L. REV. 404 (1983).
26. The weapon is new but not unique, as the forfeiture remedy may be found in other
statutes. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1955(d) (1976); 21 U.S.C. § 848(a)(2) (1976); 49 U.S.C. § 782
(1976).
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widely used throughout the country, 27 is the mandatory forfeiture. 28
Not only the remedy of forfeiture, but also the type of forfeiture is
new. Under common-law rules, property forfeited went to the victim
of the defendant's actions. Here, the property passes directly to the
government. 29
The remedy of forfeiture may prove to be a potent weapon in the
government's arsenal, but it is simply too early to decide. As RICO
prosecutions increase, however, the legal issues raised will become
ever more complex. In their article, the authors carefully evaluate
three major legal issues which will continue to be raised in the RICO
forfeiture context: application of forfeiture to the profits of the racketeering; the time at which the government may have the right to
forfeiture; and, perhaps most confusing, the question of whether the
statute requires tracing of forfeited property to its present form or is
more fully effected by allowing a choice of remedies. 30 We can fully
expect these issues to be widely litigated in the coming years.

IV.

THE CoRPORATE DEFENDANT

Professor Brickey's article unravels many of the mysteries surrounding the relationship of the conspiracy doctrine to the corporate defendant. 31 Her article analyzes the difficulties encountered in applying
general rules of criminal law to the corporate defendant. 32 In particular, she focuses attention on two important questions: whether two
corporations possess the legal capacity to conspire with one another
through a single agent who acts on behalf of both corporation entities,
and whether acquittal of the corporate agents through whom the
corporation is alleged to have conspired requires acquittal of the
corporate entity itself. 33
As the article correctly points out, the answers to questions concerning corporate conspiracy prosecutions may require reliance on considerations not present either in antitrust actions or in other conspiracy
cases. The goals of this area of criminal law are hardly clear. Professor

27. Webb & Turow, supra note 25, at 406.
28. See United States v. L'Hoste, 609 F.2d 796, 809-13 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 833
(1980).
29. Webb & Turow, supra note 25, at 405-06 n. 78.
30. Id. at 408.
31. Brickey, Conspiracy, Group Danger, and the Corporate Defendant, 52 U. CIN. L. REv.
431 (1983).
32. For instance, she discusses the important question of "the relationship between antitrust
conspiracy theory and traditional substantive criminal law." Id. at 437-40.
33. Id. at 440-42.
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Brickey's article provides a workable analytical framework and a
policy justification for analyzing these goals and applying them to the
corporate criminal defendant action.

V.

CoNCLUSION

This symposium is an important contribution to the continuing
debate over the proper way to prosecute white collar criminals. By
looking to broad policy as well as specific statutes and cases, the
authors have analyzed difficult issues and have raised important questions. These articles provide considerable guidance to judges and
lawyers who must deal with the legal problems involved in prosecuting white collar criminals.

34. /d. at_.

